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ABSTRACT
We study how the use of judgement or “add-factors” in forecasting
may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using
recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which new phenomena,
which we call exuberance equilibria, can exist in a standard self-referential
environment. Local indeterminacy is not a requirement for existence. We
construct a simple asset pricing example and find that exuberance
equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative to
fundamental equilibria.
Keywords: Learning, expectations, excess volatility, bounded rationality.
JEL Classifications: E520, E610.
1 Introduction
Judgement is a fact of life in macroeconomic forecasting. It is widely under-
stood that even the most sophisticated econometric forecasts are adjusted
before presentation. This adjustment is so pervasive that it is known as the
use of “add-factors”–subjective changes to the forecast which depend on the
forecaster’s assessment of special circumstances that are not well summarized
by the variables that are included in the econometric model.1 Recently, some
authors have argued that economic theory needs to take explicit account of
the eﬀects of judgement on the behavior of macroeconomic systems.2
We wish to think of the news or add-factor that modifies the forecast
as a qualitative, unique, commonly understood economy-wide variable. An
example of a judgemental adjustment is suggested by Reifschneider, et al.
(1997), when they discuss the “financial headwinds” that were thought to be
inhibiting U.S. economic growth in the early to mid-1990s. As they discuss,
the headwinds add-factor was used to adjust forecasts over a period of many
quarters. It was communicated to the public prominently in speeches by
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. It was thus widely understood
throughout the economy and was highly serially correlated. This is the type
of variable we have in mind, although by no means would we wish to restrict
attention to this particular example. Other examples might include the Y2K
millennium bug, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as a host
of more minor events thought to influence economic performance.
Conventional wisdom among economists suggests that judgement is all
to the good in macroeconomic forecasting. Models are, of course, crude ap-
proximations of reality and must be supplemented with other information
not contained in the model. While we motivate our ideas in terms of macro-
economic forecasting, our framework applies more generally to economic en-
vironments where expectations and qualitative judgements about the eﬀects
1See Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) for a discussion of the extent of judge-
mental adjustment in macroeconomic forecasting at the Federal Reserve.
2See Svensson (2003, 2005). Related work includes Svensson and Tetlow (2005) and
Jansson and Vredin (2001).
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of unique events play an important role.
Our focus in this paper is on how the add-factor or judgemental adjust-
ment of forecasts may create more problems than it solves. In particular,
we study ways in which judgemental adjustment may become self-fulfilling.
We study macroeconomic models in which expectations play an important
role. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we replace the rational ex-
pectations (RE) assumption with one of recursive learning. This involves the
assignment of a well-chosen perceived law of motion, an econometric fore-
casting model, to the agents. We supplement that model with a qualitative,
judgemental adjustment variable and study the resulting dynamics.
The main contribution of the paper is to define the concept of an exu-
berance equilibrium. We impose three requirements on the judgementally-
adjusted system to define this concept. The first is that any equilibrium
reached is a RE equilibrium with limited information. For this we use the
consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) concept.3 The second is a Nash
equilibrium in the inclusion of judgement–given that all agents are using
judgementally adjusted forecasts, no agent wishes to discontinue using the
judgemental adjustment. The last requirement is expectational stability or
learnability of the equilibrium.
Our Nash equilibrium does not correspond exactly to a RE equilibrium.
This is because the judgement variable is assumed to be unavailable in the
statistical part of the forecasting. We think of this as reflecting the separation
of the econometric forecasting unit from the actual decision makers. Decision
makers treat the econometric forecast as an input to which they are free to
add the judgement variable. The judgementally adjusted forecasts are the
basis for the decisions and actions of the agents, but the judgement variable
cannot be extracted by the econometric forecasting unit and converted into
a statistical time series that can be utilized in an econometric forecasting
model. In a similar vein the decision makers face a dichotomy in their use
of judgement: they either incorporate the variable as an add-factor or they
ignore it and directly use the econometric forecast. This inability of the
3See Sargent (1991), Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Hommes and Sorger (1998).
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decision makers to transmit to the econometric forecasters in a quantitative
way the judgemental aspects behind their final economic decisions is the
source of the deviation from full RE and the reason for our use of the term
“near-rationality.”4
We isolate conditions under which exuberance equilibria exist in a stan-
dard dynamic framework in which the state of the system depends on expec-
tations of future endogenous variables. We show that exuberance equilibria
exhibit higher asymptotic variance of the endogenous variable than the stan-
dard RE equilibrium. (The standard RE equilibrium is also a solution in our
framework.) As an application we study a simple univariate asset-pricing
model. We interpret the exuberance equilibrium in the asset-pricing model
as an example of “excess volatility.”5 In this paper we do not discuss policy
applications. For a discussion of the implications for monetary policy the
reader is referred to related work in Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2008).
Our results may lead one to view the possibility of exuberance equilibria as
particularly worrisome, as exuberance equilibria may exist even in otherwise
benign circumstances. In particular, we show that exuberance is a clear
possibility even in the case where the underlying RE equilibrium is unique
(a.k.a. determinate). Thus an interesting and novel finding is the possibility
of “sunspot-like” equilibria, but without requiring that the underlying RE
equilibrium of the model is indeterminate.6 In a sense, we find “sunspot-like”
4The term “near rationality” has been used elsewhere in the literature, often to mean
less-than-full maximization of utility. See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and
Caballero (1995). Ball (2000) analyzes a model where the agents use a forecasting model
that does not encompass the equilibrium law of motion–a “restricted perception.” Our
concept is based on full optimization but subject to the restriction that some information
is not quantifiable–“judgement.” Our concept of near rationality is discussed further in
Section 5.
5“Exuberance” (which in our equilibria leads to both positive and negative deviations
from the fundamentals solution) has a long informal tradition as a potential explanation of
asset price “bubbles.” For its possible role in “financial fragility” see Lagunoﬀ and Schreft
(1999).
6Indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria are distinct concepts, as discussed in Benhabib
and Farmer (1999). We consider only linear models, for which the existence of station-
ary sunspot equilibria requires indeterminacy–see for example Propositions 2 and 3 of
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991).
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equilibria without indeterminacy.
2 Economies with judgemental adjustment
We study systems in which agents use recursive algorithms to learn equilibria.
These systems can converge to a RE equilibrium provided certain conditions
are met. The conditions are outlined in some detail in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001), and the key condition is known as expectational stability. In this
paper, we alter the econometric model that the agents use to forecast in
order to allow them to use judgemental adjustment.
We consider a scalar version of the model studied in Bullard, Evans and
Honkapohja (2008)
yt = βyet+1 + ut + wt (1)
in which β is a scalar parameter and yt is the state of the system. Here ut and
wt are stochastic shocks, assumed to be white noise. The second shock wt is
included to allow for partial correlation of the fundamental shocks with the
judgemental adjustment to expectations, as discussed below. This extension
to correlated judgment was not considered in Bullard, Evans and Honkapohja
(2008).
Equations of the type (1) often describe economies linearized at a steady
state. We have normalized the steady state component to zero, so there is no
constant term. We use the notation yet+1 to represent the expectations of the
agents in the model, which may initially be non-rational. These expectations
are formed through the use of an econometric model, and the expectations
from this model are denoted by EBt yt+1. We then add a judgemental adjust-
ment variable to this econometric forecast, denoted by ξt. Thus expectations
are given by
yet+1 = E
B
t yt+1 + ξt. (2)
Without the addition of judgement, this system would be the same as the
systems analyzed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). For those systems, con-
vergence properties are well-established. Our goal in this paper is to under-
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stand how the addition of judgemental adjustment may influence convergence
properties and lead to the existence of new equilibria in the economy.
2.1 The nature of judgemental adjustment
The judgemental add-factor allows the agent to adjust the forecast in re-
sponse to qualitative, unique events that may have an impact on the econ-
omy. Let us denote the qualitative “news” as ηt.
ηt = fwt + ηˆt. (3)
We assume f ≥ 0. In other words, the news consists of both information
on the shock wt as well as exogenous white noise ηˆt. (We assume that wt
and ηˆt are independent.) The latter can be interpreted either as extraneous
randomness or as measurement error of wt. The news ηt is thought to have a
persistent impact on yt+1 which is not captured by the econometric forecast
EBt yt+1.
Following Bullard, Evans and Honkapohja (2008) we assume that the
amount of judgemental adjustment contained in yet+1 satisfies
(1− ρL) ξt = ηt, (4)
where L is a lag operator, or ξt = ρξt−1 + ηt. Thus the expected eﬀect of
past qualitative events, ρξt−1, plus the eﬀect of today’s news ηt, gives the
complete judgemental adjustment at time t. A key property is persistence
in the judgement, which we think is natural, given the examples described
above, and because the endogenous variable has corresponding persistence
in the equilibrium.
We stress that the assumption that ξt follows an AR (1) process has been
adopted here for analytical convenience only. We caution the reader not to
think of the judgemental adjustment as a quantifiable variable even though
it is written in AR (1) form. Past judgements certainly have an impact on
past forecasts, and in that sense they could be quantified. But an adjustment
for the Korean War would not be comparable to adjustments for wage and
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price controls or for the Y2K millennium bug, or for a host of other, more
minor events, and for this reason the past judgements do not provide useful
time series information.
2.2 Econometric forecasts
In the recursive learning literature, agents are assigned a perceived law of
motion (PLM) which summarizes how they use available economic data to
form expectations about the future. The PLM is chosen to be consistent
with the time-series properties of the equilibrium law of motion under RE.
The actual evolution of the system (1) will depend in part on how agents
are forming expectations, including any judgemental adjustments they are
making.
For the system with judgement, we show below that an ARMA(1,1)
process
yt = byt−1 + vt − avt−1, (5)
is appropriate since in equilibrium yt will follow an ARMA(1,1) process. In
this equation vt is stochastic and |a| < 1 and |b| < 1 are parameters. This
can be written as
yt = θ (L) vt, (6)
where
θ (L) =
1− aL
1− bL .
Then
EBt yt+1 = byt − avt = [bθ (L)− a] vt (7)
is the best forecast in a mean square error sense for the given PLM. We refer
to (7) as the econometric forecast. This part of the agents’ forecast depends
on the econometric model alone.
2.3 Exuberance equilibrium
We can now deduce the actual law of motion (ALM) for this system by
combining the expectations (2) and the eﬀect of these expectations on the
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state of the economy (1). This yields
yt = βyet+1 + ut + wt
= β
µ
b− a
1− bL
¶
vt +
β
1− ρLηt + ut + wt
= β
µ
b− a
1− bL
¶µ
1− bL
1− aL
¶
yt +
β
1− ρLηt + ut + wt.
Solving for yt and using (3), the ALM can be written as
yt =
1− aL
β (a− b) + 1− aL
£
(1− ρL)−1β(fwt + ηˆt) + (ut + wt)
¤
. (8)
The judgement term ηˆt enters the ALM, since judgement is aﬀecting the
expectations of agents and through that channel is aﬀecting actual macro-
economic outcomes yt. Of course, the agents could decide not to use a judge-
mental adjustment, in which case the ALM would not involve this term, and
this too would be an equilibrium. A critical aspect of the analysis will be to
develop the conditions under which economic actors will use a judgemental
adjustment, given that all other agents are making such an adjustment and
causing the actual law motion to be (8).
We proceed by defining the concept of an exuberance equilibrium. The
general concept is that of an equilibrium in which the judgemental adjust-
ment influences the actual evolution of the economy. The exuberance concept
has three parts, and we discuss each in detail below. We first require that
the PLM of the agents, their econometric forecast, is consistent with the ac-
tual data being generated by the economy. This is a type of non-falsifiability
assumption for the econometric model. We use the consistent expectations
equilibrium concept to impose this condition.7 A second requirement is that
there is a Nash equilibrium in the use of judgement, so that given that all
agents are using a judgementally-adjusted forecast, no agent wishes to dis-
continue using that forecast. Finally, since our agents are learning using
recursive algorithms, we impose learnability as a requirement for an exuber-
ance equilibrium.
7CEE and rational expectations equilibrium with limited information are equivalent in
our linear settings.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Consistent expectations
The main idea behind consistent expectations equilibrium is that econome-
tricians in the model should be unable to reject their model of the economy.
The econometric model should provide a good fit to the data produced by
the economy itself. We impose this idea through a requirement that the
autocovariance generating function of the econometric model (the PLM) is
equivalent to the autocovariance generating function generated by the econ-
omy (the ALM).8 We can analytically verify the existence of a solution to
the equation implied by this statement for the univariate case.
The autocovariance generating function for the PLM is given by
GPLM (z) = σ2v
(1− az) (1− az−1)
(1− bz) (1− bz−1) (9)
where σ2v is the variance of v, and z is a complex scalar.9 For the ALM, the
autocovariance generating function is the sum of three such functions
GALM (z) = Gηˆ (z) +Gu (z) +Gw(z)
by the independence of ηˆ, u, and w. The autocovariance generating function
for the ALM (8) is
GALM(z) =
(1− az) (1− az−1)
(1− ρz) (1− ρz−1) ×(
β2σ2ηˆ + (1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)σ2u
[β (a− b) + 1− az] [β (a− b) + 1− az−1]
+
σ2w(fβ + 1− ρz)(fβ + 1− ρz−1)
(β(1− a) + 1− az)(β(1− a) + 1− az−1)
¾
.
We use these functions to demonstrate the following result in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 There exists a CEE with b = ρ and a ∈ [0, ρ] .
8See e.g. Hommes and Sorger (1998) and Branch and McGough (2005).
9See Brockwell and Davis (1991, pp. 417-420), or Hamilton (1994, pp. 266-268).
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Intuitively, b = ρ in order to match the induced autoregressive process
arising from judgement. Any other value of b would lead to a higher-order
process for yt that would not be consistent with the PLM.
As shown in Appendix A, there are interesting limiting cases: when σ2η =
σ2ηˆ + f
2σ2w → 0, so that the relative variance of the judgement process is
small, a → ρ, while for σ2u + σ2w → 0, so that the relative variance of the
fundamental process is small, a → 0. Since a solution a ∈ [0, ρ] always
exists,10 the conditions for a CEE can always be met.
We now ask whether individual rationality holds with respect to inclusion
of the judgement variable in making forecasts.
3.2 Incentives to include judgement
The agents can choose not to use the judgementally adjusted forecast. But
when all other agents are using the judgemental adjustment, they cause the
ALM of the system to be given by equation (8). An individual agent faces
the question of whether the outcomes generated by this ALM can be better
forecast with a model that incorporates the judgemental adjustment, or by
one that ignores the judgemental adjustment. If each agent chooses the
former course, then all agents will use the judgementally adjusted forecast
and the ALM will remain as given in equation (8). Of course, if each agent
chooses the latter course, then no agent will use the judgementally adjusted
forecast, and the judgement variable will not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes.
The latter case leads to the standard rational expectations equilibrium viewed
here as a “no exuberance equilibrium”.
This individual rationality condition can be assessed by comparing the
forecast error variance of the two models, (2) and (7), when all other agents
are including judgement in their forecasts and hence causing the ALM to be
given by (8). Using the condition from the consistent expectations calculation
10Appendix A also makes it clear that there is a second, negative value of a that equates
the two autocovariance generating functions. We found that the other conditions for
exuberance equilibrium are not met at this value of a, and we refer to it only in passing
in the remainder of the paper.
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that b = ρ, we note that vt =
¡
1−ρL
1−aL
¢
yt. The econometric forecast is therefore
given by
EBt yt+1 =
ρ− a
1− ρLvt =
ρ− a
1− aLyt (10)
whereas the judgementally adjusted forecast is given by
yet+1 =
ρ− a
1− aLyt +
1
1− ρLηt. (11)
Is it possible for the variance of the judgementally adjusted forecast to
be lower than the variance of the econometric forecast? It is. Consider the
special case when σ2ηˆ, σ
2
w → 0 so that the positive root a → ρ. Then it is
shown in Appendix B that, apart from additive terms in ut that are identical
for the two forecasts, the forecast errors are
FE|u=0 = 1 + βf − (ρ+ kf)L
1− ρL wt+1 +
β − kL
1− ρL ηˆt+1,
where k = 1 if judgement is included and k = 0 for the case of no judgement.
For the term involving ηˆt+1 we have, with no judgement,
FE ηˆNJ =
β
1− ρLηˆt+1,
whereas the forecast error with judgement is
FEηˆJ =
β
¡
1− β−1L
¢
1− ρL ηˆt+1.
Thus, as σ2ηˆ → 0 the ratio between the variances of these terms is11
V ar[FE ηˆJ ]
V ar[FEηˆNJ ]
= 1 + β−2 − 2β−1ρ.
This is less than one if and only if
ρβ >
1
2
. (12)
11See, for instance, Harvey (1981, p. 40). The variance of xt = [(1 +mL) / (1− cL)] t
is
£¡
1 +m2 + 2cm
¢
/
¡
1− c2
¢¤
σ2 .
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For the term involving wt+1 we get for the relevant variances
V ar[FEwNJ ]− V ar[FEwJ ] ³
f
1 + βf
µ
2ρ− 2ρ+ f
1 + βf
¶
,
where ³ means “is positively proportional to.” It is seen that the term in
the brackets is positive for all f ≥ 0 when βρ > 1/2.
By continuity, it follows that if β > 1/2 there are non-trivial judgement
processes (with ρ > 1/2β and σ2ηˆ, σ
2
w > 0 suﬃciently small) for which the
agents have incentives to include the process as an add factor in their fore-
casts. The preceding argument considered the limiting case a → ρ, but as
we will numerically show below, it is not necessary for a to be close to ρ for
our results to hold.
It is useful to consider further aspects of this comparison. For simplicity
we now assume that σ2w = 0 so that there is no correlation between fun-
damental shocks and judgement. Polar opposite to the case σ2ηˆ → 0 is the
special case σ2u → 0, in which case the positive root a→ 0. It can be shown
that in this case
V ar[FEJ ]− V ar[FENJ ] =
Ã¡
β−1 − ρ
¢2
1− ρ2
!
σ2η.
This can never be less than zero, so that agents will not make the judgemental
adjustment in this case.
By continuity, for the case of uncorrelated judgement, we deduce that for
R = σ2η/σ2u large it will not be individually rational to include judgement, but
if ρβ > 1
2
there are values of R = σ2η/σ2u ∈ (0,∞) such that agents rationally
choose to use a judgementally adjusted forecast, given that all other agents
are doing so.12 The conclusion that it can be optimal to judgementally adjust
the econometric forecast is striking since this forecast already reflects the
eﬀects of judgement on the time series properties of the observable variables.
Figure 1 illustrates our points numerically for the case of uncorrelated
judgement. For a < ρ, the forecast error variances involve the variance of an
12The case with a ≈ ρ is a near-common factor representation of the time series, but the
required variances remain continuous in the parameters, as can be seen from the formulae
in Appendix B.
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2
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6
Value of a(R)
V
[F
E
J]
,V
[F
E
N
J]
0.01 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.45 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.89
Figure 1.  Including Judgement.
Scalar case.
Figure drawn for ß=.9, rho=.9.
V[FENJ]
V[FEJ]
Figure 1: The variance of the forecast error, with (FEJ) and without (FENJ)
judgement. The variance can be lower with judgement included, even for
values of a far from ρ.
ARMA(2, 2) process, which is given in Appendix B. The Figure is drawn for
β = .9 and ρ = .9, which is a possible case. To draw Figure 1, we consider
changes in R resulting from changes in σ2u with σ2η fixed. The variances of
the forecast errors with and without judgement are plotted on the vertical
axis, while the implied a is plotted on the horizontal axis. The special cases
(i) R → ∞, a → 0 and (ii) R → 0, a → ρ, which were discussed above
are borne out in the Figure. The Figure also shows intermediate cases, and
indicates that a does not have to be particularly close to ρ for the individual
rationality condition to be met. In fact, the two forecast error variances are
equal at a ≈ .21, which is far from the value of ρ in this example, which is .9.
12
We conclude that the conditions for exuberance equilibria to exist are quite
likely to be met for a wide range of relative variances R provided both β and
ρ are relatively close to one.13
3.3 Learnability
Because we have agents using recursive algorithms to learn, a plausibility
condition for exuberance equilibrium is that any candidate equilibrium is
learnable. We follow the literature on recursive learning to impose this re-
quirement.14
In the current context, the CEE formulated above takes the form of an
ARMA(1,1) process. Estimation of ARMA(1,1) processes is usually done us-
ing maximum likelihood techniques, taking us beyond standard least squares
estimation. Recursive maximum likelihood (RML) algorithms are available
and they have formal similarities to recursive least squares estimation.15 Be-
cause this technical analysis is relatively unfamiliar, we confine the formal
details to Appendix C. However, the results are easily summarized. Let at
and bt denote estimates at time t of the coeﬃcients of the ARMA forecast
function (7). Numerical computations using RML indicate convergence of
(at, bt) to (a, ρ), where a > 0 is the CEE value given in Lemma 1. Thus this
CEE is indeed stable under learning. Moreover, in Section 3.4 we state a
formal convergence result as part of our existence theorem.
13One suspects that the individual rationality constraint is binding at values ρβ < 1/2.
For example, if ρ = .7 and β = .7, an analogous numerical exercise shows that the
judgementally adjusted forecast is never preferable to the econometric forecast.
14Evans and Honkapohja (2001) gives a systematic treatment of adaptive learning and
its implications in macroeconomics. Evans and Honkapohja (1999), Marimon (1997) and
Sargent (1993, 1999) provide surveys of the field.
15They are also called Recursive Prediction Error (RPE) algorithms–see Evans and
Honkapohja (1994) and Marcet and Sargent (1995) for other uses of RPE methods in
learning.
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3.4 Existence and properties of equilibrium
We now collect the various results above. The following theorem gives the
key results about existence of an exuberance equilibrium and characterizes
its asymptotic variance:
Theorem 2 Consider the model with judgement and suppose that β > 1/2.
Then
(i) for appropriate AR(1) judgement processes there exists an exuberance
equilibrium and
(ii) the exuberance equilibrium has a higher asymptotic variance than the RE
equilibrium.
Proof. (i) The preceding analysis has verified that the first two conditions
for an exuberance equilibrium defined in Section 2.3, consistent expectations
and incentives to include judgement, are met for all σ2η > 0 suﬃciently small.
In Appendix C it is proved that the third condition also holds, that is, the
CEE is stable under RML learning, when σ2η > 0 is suﬃciently small.
(ii) The RE equilibrium for the model is yt = ut+wt since 0 < β < 1 and
ut and wt are iid with mean zero. The exuberance equilibrium with a > 0
can be represented as the ARMA(1,1) process yt = ρyt−1 + vt − avt−1 where
a solves equation (16) given in Appendix A. From (15) of Appendix A it can
be seen that σ2va [β (a− ρ) + 1] = σ2uρ+ σ2w(1 + fβ)ρ. Thus
σ2v =
ρ
a(β(a− ρ) + 1)σ
2
u +
(fβ + 1)ρ
a(β(a− ρ) + 1)σ
2
w > σ
2
u + σ
2
w,
since a < ρ, f ≥ 0 and 0 < β, ρ < 1. Next, using the formula for the variance
of an ARMA(1,1) process we have
σ2y =
1 + a2 − 2ρa
1− ρ2 σ
2
v
and since 1+a
2−2ρa
1−ρ2 > 1, the result follows.
The theorem states that in an exuberance equilibrium, the variance of the
state variable yt is larger than it would be in a fundamental RE equilibrium.
14
This is because the REE has yt = ut + wt, so that σ2y = σ2u + σ2w, but in an
exuberance equilibrium σ2y > σ2u + σ2w.16
4 An Asset Pricing Example
A simple univariate example of the framework (1) is given by the standard
present value model of asset pricing. One convenient way of obtaining this
equation is the model of Brock and Hommes (1998). In their framework
agents are myopic mean-variance maximizers who choose the quantity of
riskless and risky assets in their portfolio to maximize expected value of a
quadratic utility function of end of period wealth.17
We modify their framework to allow for shocks to the supply of the risky
asset.18 For convenience we assume homogeneous expectations and constant
known dividends. The temporary equilibrium is given by
pet+1 + d−Rfpt = st,
where d is the dividend, pt is the price of the asset and Rf > 1 is the rate of
return factor on the riskless asset. Here st is a linear function of the random
supply of the risky asset per investor, assumed i.i.d. for simplicity.19 Defining
yt = pt − p¯, where s¯ = Est and p¯ = (d − s¯)/(Rf − 1), we obtain (1) with
β = R−1f , ut = −R−1f (st− s¯) and wt ≡ 0. We assume that 0 < β < 1, so that
the model is determinate, that is, under RE there is a unique nonexplosive
solution, given by the “fundamentals” solution yt = ut. In particular, under
RE, sunspot solutions do not exist.
16To examine the amount of correlation between the fundamental ut+wt and the judge-
ment innovation ηt, we also considered the limit σ
2
ηˆ → 0 and computed the correlation
for diﬀerent values of σ2u, σ2w and f under the constraints of learning convergence and
inclusion of judgement is a CEE. For example, if β = ρ = 0.95, f = 1 and σ2ηˆ very small,
the correlation can be pushed beyond 0.9 before the conditions start to fail.
17There are, of course, alternative ways to derive the same equation.
18The role of share supply has recently been stressed in the finance literature, e.g. see
Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006).
19Using the notation of Brock and Hommes (1998) st = aσ2zst, where σ2 is the con-
ditional variance of excess returns (assumed constant), a is a parameter of the utility
function and zst is the (random) asset supply.
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Theorem 2 shows that the basic asset pricing model is consistent with ex-
cess volatility. If investors incorporate judgemental factors that are strongly
serially correlated, they will find that this improves their forecasts, but in
an exuberance equilibrium this will also generate significant stationary asset
price movements in excess of those associated with fundamental factors. The
stationarity of our exuberance movements is in marked contrast to the liter-
ature on rational asset price bubbles. Because the latter are explosive, the
literature on rational bubbles has been punctuated by controversy and com-
plicated by the need to construct valid tests for non-stationary bubbles. Ex-
uberance equilibria oﬀer an alternative approach to modeling bubbles within
a stationary time series framework.
A natural question is whether the excess volatility associated with an ex-
uberance equilibrium is economically meaningful, or if the exuberance condi-
tions outlined in Theorem 2 are only met for situations in which the variance
σ2y is just trivially larger than the fundamental variance. In particular, it is
of interest to know if the excess volatility eﬀect isolated in the theorem is
large enough to be comparable to empirical estimates of the degree of excess
volatility in financial data. One famous calculation due to Shiller (1981)
put the ratio of the standard deviation of U.S. stock prices to the standard
deviation of prices based on fundamental alone at between 5 and 13.20
Table 1 provides illustrative calculations of exuberance equilibria for rep-
resentative parameter values. In the REE, yt = ut, the standard deviation of
prices is σu The Table gives relative volatility results in exuberance equilibria
for diﬀerent ratios σξ/σu, ranging from 0.5 to 2.0. Since σ2ξ = σ
2
η/ (1− ρ2)
the innovation variance associated with judgement is quite modest for high
values of ρ. We examine an empirically plausible case where the discount fac-
tor β = 0.95, and where the degree of serial correlation ρ is relatively high.
A dash in the table indicates that an exuberance equilibrium does not exist
for the indicated parameter values. The entries in the table are a measure
20Shiller (1981) actually compared the variance of equity prices to the variance of their
ex post price (the present value of actual future dividends), but the latter must exceed
the variance of the fundamentals price under rational expectations.
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Table 1. Excess Volatility
σξ/σu
0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
ρ = 0.70 1.54 2.74 − −
ρ = 0.80 1.85 3.62 5.58 −
ρ = 0.90 2.70 5.82 9.11 12.43
ρ = 0.95 3.99 8.75 13.64 18.56
Table 1: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. A dash indicates
that exuberance equilibrium does not exist. Entries give the ratio of the
standard deviation of y to the standard deviation of u.
of excess volatility corresponding to Shiller’s (1981) concept, namely, σy/σu.
The results indicate that these measures are often in the range of 5 to 13
estimated by Shiller.
We conclude based on this illustrative calculation that the model can
generate substantial excess volatility without diﬃculty. We remark that if we
push the discount factor β closer to unity, the degree of excess volatility can
rise to very high levels for high degrees of serial correlation, with σy many
hundreds of times larger than σu. In this sense, the model can generate
arbitrarily large amounts of excess volatility. We think these results are
striking since they indicate that the possibility of near-rational exuberance
in model that are usually regarded as well-behaved. In addition to excess
volatility, there are, of course, other stylized facts and puzzles concerning
asset prices, involving the related issues of Sharpe ratios, predictability of
excess returns, and the equity premium puzzle.21 Because our exuberance
equilibria generate both excess volatility and positively serially correlated
prices, we think our enlarged class of equilibria may be able to shed light
on these phenomena. However, investigation of these issues would require a
serious calibration of the model, and we reserve this topic for future research.
21See, for example, Lettau and Uhlig (2002).
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5 Rationality tests of judgement
Our exuberance equilibrium is near-rational but not fully rational. There
are two ways in which we have imposed assumptions that deviate from full
rationality. First, the judgement process ξt is assumed not directly available
to (or usable by) econometric forecasters, who rely purely on the observ-
ables yt. This seems realistic because ξt is the adjustment the judgemental
forecasters believe is appropriate due to “unique” qualitative events. This
procedure thus reflects a natural division of labor in which the econometri-
cians produce the best statistical forecast based on the observable variables of
interest, and the judgemental forecasters modify these forecasts as they think
is appropriate. Although ξt = yet+1 − EtyBt+1 may possibly be obtainable by
the econometricians (at least with a lag), we would expect the judgemental
forecasters to resist the incorporation of ξt into the econometric model.
Furthermore, older ξt−j represent diﬀerent unique events, unrelated to the
current judgemental variable. Econometric models sometimes incorporate
dummy variables (or other proxies) to capture the quantitative eﬀects of
qualitative events, but as the events become more distant such variables
tend to get dropped and rolled into the unobserved random shocks in order
to preserve degrees of freedom. The impact of recent qualitative events could
be estimated by incorporating dummy variables into the econometric model,
but for forecasting purposes this would be unhelpful, and would still leave
the problem of forecasting the future impact of qualitative factors to the
judgemental forecasters.
The second way in which our exuberance equilibrium is not fully ra-
tional is that the incentive condition is assumed dichotomous. This also
seems realistic, since its inclusion is determined by the judgemental fore-
caster. Furthermore, econometric tests of whether “all” of ξt should have
been included would often have low power. Suppose we allowed for just a
proportion k ∈ [0, 1] of the judgement to be included in the forecast. It can
be shown that the minimum MSE in the univariate case occurs at k = βρ.
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Table 2. Test rejection rates
ρ
0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99
n = 120 47.6 5.1 0.1 0 0.4 2.0
n = 240 86.8 15.9 1.4 0 0.4 1.7
n = 480 99.7 48.0 3.5 0 0.4 1.0
Table 2: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. Percent of test
rejections at 5 percent level of the null hypothesis that including judgement is
fully rational, that is, Ho: k=1. Results given are based on 1000 replications.
For βρ near one, rationality tests using
yt+1 − yet+1 = (1− k) ξt + ζt+1 (13)
of the null hypothesis H0 : k = 1 have low power, and considerable data
would be required to detect that not all of ξt should be optimally included.
We illustrate this point in Table 2, which takes into account both aspects
of bounded rationality discussed above. Suppose that econometricians do
have access ex post to the judgementally adjusted forecasts yet+1, and there-
fore to ξt = yet+1 − EBt yt+1, and that they estimate (13) and test the null
hypothesis H0 : k = 1 that the inclusion of judgement is fully rational. For
the purposes of this test we set the discount factor at β = 1−0.05/12 = 0.9958
in line with a real monthly risk-free rate of return of 0.05/12.22 We also set
σ2ξ/σ
2
u = 1.0. The three sample sizes shown correspond to 10, 20 and 40 years
of monthly data and the nominal significance level of the test is set at 5%.
When ρ is below 0.8 one would expect to eventually detect a deviation from
full rationality. However, it can be seen that for ρ at or above 0.85, rejection
of the null is unlikely even with 40 years of data. In particular, for ρ = 0.9 or
ρ = 0.95 any deviation of the judgmental forecasts from full rationality would
be virtually undetectable except with enormous sample sizes. Furthermore,
these cases correspond to large, empirically plausible values of excess volatil-
22In the Brock and Hommes (1998) set-up, β is the inverse of the risk-free real rate-of-
return factor. The value chosen here corresponds to an annual discount rate of 5% p.a.,
but the results of Table 2 are quite similar if 3% p.a. (or 7% p.a.) is used.
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ity: for the parameter settings of Table 2 we have excess volatility measures
of σy/σu = 8.40 for ρ = 0.9 and σy/σu = 16.39 for ρ = 0.95.
From Table 2 we see that, for an exuberance equilibrium with ρ values
above 0.85, decision makers are likely to conclude that the functional division
of labor between econometricians, who supply forecasts based on the observ-
able variable yt, and judgemental forecasters, who adjust these forecasts to
take account of perceived qualitative events omitted from the econometric
model, is entirely appropriate. Because an exuberance equilibrium is a CEE,
the econometricians are fully taking into account the predictable serial corre-
lation properties of the variable being forecast. At the same time, the mean
square forecast error is smaller for the judgemental forecasts than for the pure
econometric forecast, and thus there is a clear gain to forecast performance
in making use of the judgemental adjustment.
The uniqueness of qualitative events is also relevant to the issue at hand.
Suppose, for example, that ρ = 0.8 and that rationality tests eventually
indicate a statistically significant deviation from full rationality, with an es-
timated value near k = 0.8. It does not really seem plausible that forecasters
would decide to downweight current judgemental adjustments, based on the
finding that such adjustments over the last 20 years or so have been about
20% too high, since past judgemental adjustments mainly concerned diﬀer-
ent qualitative events, and since the adjustments may have been made by
diﬀerent judgemental forecasters. Furthermore, even if on this basis current
judgement is downweighted, and even if this eventually results in the role of
judgement being gradually extinguished over time, a new qualitative event
will at some point suggest the need once again for judgement, with the judge-
ment process again becoming persistent. In this sense, an economy in which
exuberance equilibria exist always remains “subject to judgement.”
6 Conclusions and possible extensions
We have studied how a new phenomenon, exuberance equilibria, may arise in
standard macroeconomic environments. We assume that agents are learning
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in the sense that they are employing and updating econometric models used
to forecast the future values of variables they care about. Unhindered, this
learning process would converge to a RE equilibrium in the economies we
study. We investigated the idea that decision-makers may be tempted to
include judgemental adjustments to their forecasts if all others in the econ-
omy are similarly judgementally adjusting their forecasts. The judgemental
adjustment, or add factor, is a pervasive and widely-acknowledged feature of
actual macroeconometric forecasting in industrialized economies. We obtain
conditions under which such add-factoring can become self-fulfilling, altering
the actual dynamics of the economy significantly, but in a way that remains
consistent with the econometric model of the agents.
In order to develop our central points we have made some strong simpli-
fying assumptions. We have assumed that the exuberance or judgement vari-
ables take a simple autoregressive form, but this assumption is mainly made
for convenience. While we do believe that judgemental adjustments exhibit
strong positive serial correlation, a more complicated stationary stochastic
process could instead be used. The assumption of identical judgements of
diﬀerent (representative) agents is correspondingly restrictive. Allowing for
diﬀerences in judgements by individual agents would probably make the con-
ditions for exuberance equilibrium more diﬃcult to achieve. On the other
hand, this could create new phenomena, such as momentum eﬀects arising
when a large fraction of agents begin to agree in their judgements.
The incorporation of judgment into decisions, in the form of adjustments
to econometric forecasts, can have a self-fulfilling feature in the sense that
decisions makers would believe ex post that their judgement had improved
their forecasts. This result is similar in spirit to the self-fulfilling nature of
sunspot equilibria, but with the novel feature that it can arise in determinate
models in which there is a unique RE equilibrium that depends only on fun-
damentals. This widens the set of models in which self-fulfilling fluctuations
might plausibly emerge. In particular, we have shown that exuberance equi-
libria can arise in the standard asset-pricing model, generating substantial
excess volatility.
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Appendices
A Conditions for CEE
It can be seen from the form of GALM (z) that, for arbitrary a and b, the
ALM is an ARMA(2,2) process. As we will now show, there are choices of a
and b that yield GPLM (z) = GALM (z). These choices of a and b also have
the property that the corresponding ALM takes an ARMA(1,1) form that
matches the PLM. This is possible if a and b are chosen so that there is a
common factor in the numerator and denominator of the expression on the
right-hand side of GALM (z).
We now set GPLM (z) = GALM (z) , under the condition b = ρ, so that
the poles of the autocovariance generating functions agree. This yields
σ2v =
(
β2σ2ηˆ + (1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)σ2u
(β (a− b) + 1− az)(β (a− b) + 1− az−1)
+
σ2w(fβ + 1− ρz)(fβ + 1− ρz−1)
(β(1− a) + 1− az)(β(1− a) + 1− az−1)
¾
or
σ2v [β (a− ρ) + 1− az]
£
β (a− ρ) + 1− az−1
¤
=
β2σ2ηˆ + (1− ρz)
¡
1− ρz−1
¢
σ2u + σ
2
w(fβ + 1− ρz)(fβ + 1− ρz−1)
This equation can be written as
σ2v
©
[1 + β (a− ρ)]2 + a2
ª
− σ2va [β (a− ρ) + 1]
¡
z + z−1
¢
=
β2σ2ηˆ+σ
2
u
¡
1 + ρ2
¢
−σ2uρ
¡
z + z−1
¢
+σ2w[(fβ+1)
2+ρ2−(fβ+1)ρ(z+z−1)].
For the autocovariances of the PLM and ALM to be equal, the coeﬃcients
on the powers of z in this equation must be equal. Equating these we obtain
the two equations
σ2v
©
[1 + β (a− ρ)]2 + a2
ª
= β2σ2ηˆ + σ
2
u
¡
1 + ρ2
¢
+ σ2w[(fβ + 1)
2 + ρ2] (14)
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and
σ2va [β (a− ρ) + 1] = σ2uρ+ σ2w(fβ + 1)ρ. (15)
We wish to solve for a value of a such that |a| < 1. Solving equation (15) for
σ2v and substituting the result into equation (14), at a CEE a solves
Fˆ (a) ≡ cˆ2a2 + cˆ1a+ cˆ0 = 0 (16)
with
cˆ2 = −tˆ(1 + β2) + sˆβ,
cˆ1 = −2tˆβ(1− ρβ) + sˆ(1− ρβ),
cˆ0 = −tˆ(1− ρβ)2
where sˆ = β2σ2ηˆ+(1+ρ
2)σ2u+σ2w((1+fβ)2+ρ2) and tˆ = σ2uρ+σ2wρ(1+fβ).
Clearly, Fˆ (0) < 0 when f ≥ 0. Next we consider Fˆ (ρ). Using Mathematica
it is verified that
Fˆ (ρ) = βρ[βσ2ηˆ + σ
2
wf(βf + 1− ρ2)].
Clearly, Fˆ (ρ) > 0 for f ≥ 0. It follows that there exists a CEE with 0 < a <
ρ. Furthermore, by inspecting Fˆ (ρ) it is seen that a→ ρ when σ2η → 0. Also
a→ 0 when σ2u + σ2w → 0 since tˆ→ 0.
There can be a second, negative root. However, our numerical results
indicate that the CEE corresponding to the negative root is not learnable.
B Impact of Judgement
The induced ALM, as depicted in equation (8), is
yt =
1− aL
β (a− b) + 1− aL
£
(1− ρL)−1β(fwt + ηˆt) + (ut + wt)
¤
. (17)
By substituting equation (17) into both (10) and (11), we can write the two
types of forecasts in terms of the shocks ut and ηt. These expressions become
EBt yt+1 =
ρ− a
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
µ
β
1− ρLηt + ut + wt
¶
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in the case of no judgement, and
yet+1 =
ρ− a
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
µ
β
1− ρLηt + ut + wt
¶
+
1
1− ρLηt
in the case of the judgementally adjusted forecast. The actual state of the
economy at time t+ 1 is, from equation (17),
yt+1 =
1− aL
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
µ
β
1− ρLηt+1 + ut+1 + wt+1
¶
. (18)
We can therefore compute forecast errors in each of the two cases. When
computing these forecast errors, we save on clutter by ignoring the terms
involving u, as these will be the same whether or not the agent judgementally
adjusts the forecast. The forecast error in the case of no judgement can be
written as
FENJ ≡ [yt+1 −EBt yt+1] |u=w=0 =
β
1 + β (a− ρ)
1h
1−
³
a
1+β(a−ρ)
´
L
iηt+1
(19)
whereas in the case of a judgementally adjusted forecast it is
yt+1 − yet+1 =
1
1 + β(a− ρ)− aL ×½∙
βf(1− aL)− (ρ− a)βfL
1− ρL + (1− aL)
¸
wt+1+
β(1− aL)− (ρ− a)βL
1− ρL ηˆt+1
¾
− kfL
1− ρLwt+1 −
kL
1− ρLηˆt+1
+ term in ut+1,
where k = 1 if judgement is included, and zero otherwise. These equations
simplify to those given in the text for the case a→ ρ.
When σ2ηˆ → 0, σ2w → 0, the relevant terms in the forecast error for
assessing judgement are:
1 + βf − (ρ+ kf)L
1− ρL wt+1 +
β − kL
1− ρL ηˆt+1.
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For the second term the comparison is in the main text. For the term in-
volving wt+1 we get for the relevant variances
V ar |k=0 − V ar |k=1 ³ f
1 + βf
µ
2ρ− 2ρ+ f
1 + βf
¶
,
where ³ means “is positively proportional to.” It is seen that the term in
the brackets is positive for all f when βρ > 1/2. This implies that adding a
small correlation between judgement and unobserved fundamentals does not
alter the incentive condition for inclusion of judgement. In other words, if
βρ > 1/2 an individual agent will make the judgemental adjustment to the
forecast for suﬃciently small values of σ2ηˆ and σ
2
w.
Next, we give the formula to compute the variance of the ARMA(2,2)
process needed for the numerics behind Figure 1. Apart from the lead coef-
ficient β/ (1 + β (a− ρ)) , each forecast error process is in the generic class
xt =
1 +m1L+m2L2
1− c1L− c2L2
t.
Using the procedure described on pp. 26-27 of Granger and Newbold (1986),
one can solve simultaneously for V ar(xt), Cov(xt, xt−1) and Cov(xt, xt−2) to
obtain
V ar (xt) =
xnum
xden
σ2 , (20)
where
xnum =
(1 + c2) c1 (m1 +m2c1 +m2m1)
1− c2
+
(m1 +m2c1) (c1 +m1) +
¡
1 + 2m2c2 +m22
¢
and
xden = 1−
c21
1− c2
− c2c
2
1
1− c2
− c22.
Considering the forecast error in the case without judgement included,
equation (19), we set m1 = m2 = c2 = 0 and c1 = a/ [1 + β (a− ρ)] in
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equation (20). For the case with judgement, we set
m1 = − (1 + aβ)β−1,
m2 = aβ−1,
c1 =
a+ ρ [1 + β (a− ρ)]
1 + β (a− ρ) ,
c2 =
−aρ
1 + β (a− ρ) ,
and a is determined by β, ρ and σ2η/σ2u.
C Recursive maximum likelihood
We now consider recursive estimation when the PLM is an ARMA(1,1)
process, that is,
yt = byt−1 + vt + cvt−1,
where yt is observed but the white noise process vt is not observed. Let bt
and ct denote the estimates of b and c using data through time t − 1. The
econometricians are assumed to use a recursive maximum likelihood (RML)
algorithm, which we now describe.23
Let φ0t = (bt, ct). To implement the algorithm an estimate εt of vt is
required. Let εt = yt − x0t−1φt−1, where x0t−1 = (yt−1, εt−1). yt is given by
yt = β [EBt yt+1 + ξt] + ut + wt, where EBt yt+1 = bt−1yt + ct−1εt. The RML
algorithm is as follows
ψt = −ct−1ψt−1 + xt
φt = φt−1 + t
−1R−1t−1ψt−1εt
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(ψt−1ψ
0
t−1 −Rt−1).
The question of interest is whether φt converges to a CEE. Convergence
23For further details on the algorithm see Section 2.2.3 of Ljung and Soderstrom (1983).
The algorithm is often called a recursive prediction error algorithm.
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can be studied using the associated ordinary diﬀerential equation
dφ
dτ
= R−1Eψt(φ)εt(φ) (21)
dR
dτ
= Eψt(φ)ψt(φ)
0 −R. (22)
Here yt(φ), ψt(φ) and εt(φ) denote the stationary processes for yt, ψt and
εt with φt set at a constant value φ. Using the stochastic approximation
tools discussed in Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (1998)
and Chapter 6 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it can be shown that the
RML algorithm locally converges provided the associated ordinary diﬀeren-
tial equation is locally asymptotically stable (analogous instability results
are also available). Numerically, convergence of (21)-(22) can be verified us-
ing a discrete time version of the diﬀerential equation. A first-order state
space form is convenient for computing the expectations Eψt(φ)εt(φ) and
Eψt(φ)ψt(φ)0 and this procedure was used for the numerical illustrations
given in the main text.
We now prove convergence analytically for all 0 < β, ρ < 1 with σ2ηˆ and
σ2w suﬃciently small. This completes the proof of part (i) in Theorem 1. We
rewrite the system (21)-(22) in the form
dφ
dτ
= (R)−1g(φ)
dR
dτ
= Mψ(φ)−R
where we have introduced the simplifying notation g(φ) = Eψt(φ)εt(φ) and
Mψ(φ) = Eψt(φ)ψt(φ)0. An equilibrium φ¯, R¯ of the system is defined by
g(φ¯) = 0 and R¯ = Mψ(φ¯). As mentioned in Appendix A, there can be two
equilibrium values φ¯0 = (ρ,−a) determined by the solutions to the quadratic
(16), but we here focus on the solution with 0 < a < 1. Recall that for this
solution a→ ρ as σ2η → 0.
Linearizing the system at the equilibrium point, it can be seen that the
linearized system has a block diagonal structure, in which one block has the
eigenvalues equal to −1 (with multiplicity four) and the eigenvalues of the
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other block are equal to those of the “small” diﬀerential equation
dφ
dτ
= (R¯)−1J(φ¯)(φ− φ¯), (23)
where J(φ) is the Jacobian matrix of g(φ). The system (21)-(22) is there-
fore locally asymptotically stable if the coeﬃcient matrix (R¯)−1J(φ¯) of the
two-dimensional linear system (23) has a negative trace and a positive de-
terminant. Since (R¯)−1 = (det(R¯))−1adj(R¯) we have
Tr[(R¯)−1J(φ¯)] = (det(R¯))−1Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and
det[(R¯)−1J(φ¯)] = det[(R¯)−1] det[J(φ¯)].
Now det(R¯) > 0 as R¯ is a matrix of second moments and thus positive
definite for σ2η > 0. It thus remains to prove that Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] < 0 and
det[J(φ¯)] > 0 when σ2η > 0 is suﬃciently small.
We consider the values of Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] when σ2η → 0.
Using the definition of εt, the explicit form of g(φ) is
g(φ) = Eψt−1(φ)x
0
t−1
∙
(1− βb− βc)−1β
µ
−bc
−c2
¶
−
µ
b
c
¶¸
+(1− βb− βc)−1βρEψt−1(φ)ξt−1,
where the moment matrices Eψt−1(φ)x0t−1 and Eψt−1(φ)ξt−1 can be com-
puted from the state space form
AXt = CXt−1 +H
⎡
⎣
ut
ηˆt
wt
⎤
⎦ , with Xt =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
yt
εt
ξt
ψt
ψt−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 −(1− βb)−1βc −(1− βb)−1β 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0
0 −1 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
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C =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0 0
−b −c 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0
0 0 0 −c 0
0 0 0 0 −c
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, H =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1− βb)−1 0 (1− βb)−1
0 0 0
0 1 f
0 0 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
For the limit σ2ηˆ → 0 and σ2w → 0 we first set σ2w = λσ2ηˆ, where λ > 0
is arbitrary. It can be computed using Mathematica 4 (routine available on
request) that Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] have the following properties as
functions of (using temporary notation) ω ≡ σ2ηˆ:
lim
ω→0
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = lim
ω→0
d
dω
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = 0,
lim
ω→0
det[J(φ¯)] = lim
ω→0
d
dω
det[J(φ¯)] = 0,
lim
ω→0
d2
dω2
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = −4β
2ρ2[β + fλ(1 + fβ − ρ2)]2
(1− βρ)(ρ2 − 1)6 < 0 and
lim
ω→0
d2
dω2
det[J(φ¯)] =
2β2ρ2[β + fλ(1 + fβ − ρ2)]2
(ρ2 − 1)6 > 0.
The two latter derivatives are evidently locally smooth functions in view of
the form of g(φ). Expressing Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] in terms of Taylor
series these results show that
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] < 0 and det[J(φ¯)] > 0
for σ2η > 0 suﬃciently small. Q.E.D.
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